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I. INTRODUCTION
Under present judicial principles, United States courts may give
conclusive effect to virtually all types of final judgments issued by
foreign jurisdictions. However, pursuant to a concept called the "rev-
enue rule," American tribunals refuse to acknowledge revenue laws
of other countries.' The revenue rule prevents recognition or
enforcement 2 of a wide range of judicial rulings. It can prevent a
forum from entertaining a suit to enforce a foreign decree for taxes,3
for collection of the assessments themselves, 4 for recovery of debts
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Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of B.C. v. Gilbertson, 597
F.2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1979); Banco Frances E Brasileiro S.A. v. Doe, 331 N.E.2d 502
(N.Y. 1935), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 867 (1975); Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. A. C.
Israel Commodity Co., 190 N.E.2d 235 (N.Y. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 906
(1964); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 483 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
2 There is a distinction between the notions of recognition and enforcement of
a judgment. A foreign decision must be entitled to recognition in order to be enforced
in the United States. However, recognition of an adjudication affects a variety of
other situations as well, such as the res judicata effect of the initial ruling, habitual
criminal statutes, or double jeopardy issues. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 481 cmt.
b. This difference is not of essential importance in the context of the revenue rule
since courts decline both recognition and enforcement of foreign revenue laws.
, E.g., Gilbertson, 597 F.2d at 1161. In Gilbertson, a Canadian province sought
collection in the United States on a judgment for logging taxes assessed against U.S.
citizens acting in Canada.
4 See Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1929) (L. Hand, J., concurring),
aff'd on other grounds, 281 U.S. 18 (1930); Colorado v. Harbeck, 133 N.E. 357
(N.Y. 1921); State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Rodgers, 193 S.W.2d 919 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1946) (all discussing collection of tax assessments in connection with actions
between two U.S. states). In Moore, a county treasurer in Indiana attempted to
recover taxes in New York from the estate of a decedent who had previously lived
in Indiana. The New York circuit court affirmed the district court's dismissal of
the complaint. Harbeck involved a suit in New York by Colorado for transfer taxes
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arising out of other fiscal claims,5 as well as limit defenses which
are based on alien revenue laws. 6
Under this doctrine, United States courts 7 also generally decline
recovery by other nations on final decisions for taxes8 issued abroad. 9
The scarce state case law available indicates that state tribunals feel
that enforcement is not mandated, I0 as does the Uniform Laws
against an estate of a resident who died while temporarily in New York. The plaintiff
in Rodgers sought to collect income taxes previously incurred in Missouri, while
defendants resided in Oklahoma.
See, for example, Government of India v. Taylor, [1955] App. Cas. 491 (appeal
taken from H.L. (E)), in which a Commonwealth court determined that India could
not bring a suit for a capital profits assessment in England due from a British
company carrying on business in Delhi.
I See, e.g., Banco Do Brasil, 190 N.E.2d at 235, where an action by Brazil
against a New York importer of coffee for fraudulently circumventing Brazilian
foreign exchange regulations was held to be contrary to New York public policy
despite the Bretton Woods agreement between the two countries which demonstrated
a favorable policy toward exchange laws.
6 E.g., Ludlow v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns. 94 (N.Y. 1806). In Ludlow, the
defendant executed a promissory note in France to an agent of Randall who resided
in New York where the agreement was to be paid. The court held that the plaintiff,
a trustee for the creditors of Randall, could recover despite that under French laws,
the note would have been unenforceable.
Compare Banco Frances E Brasileiro S.A. v. Doe, 331 N.E.2d 502 (N.Y. 1935),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 867 (1975), where the court permitted a private Brazilian
bank to recover in tort and rescind currency exchange transactions against a private
plaintiff who had fraudulently induced the bank to engage in the bargains which
were in violation of Brazilian exchange laws. The opinion distinguished itself from
the revenue rule based on the United States' membership in the International Mon-
etary Fund and the fact that a private plaintiff was involved.
I Since Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), United States courts
have assumed that the acknowledgment of foreign-country judgments in a state
action or a federal tribunal sitting in diversity are governed by the law of the forum
state. E.g., Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya), 492 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Tex.
1980).
1 Tax adjudications to which jurisdictions refuse conclusive effect include de-
cisions based on assessments of levies for income, transfer of wealth, property, or
transactions in the taxing state in favor of the foreign sovereign or a subdivision.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 483 cmt. c (1986).
9 The United States Supreme Court, however, has never ruled directly on the
issue of whether United States jurisdictions must grant effect to foreign tax decrees,
although references to the revenue rule in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 413-414 (1964) suggest that the United States Supreme Court would
support continued denial of validation.
1o E.g., Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of B.C. v. Gilbertson,
597 F.2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1979); City of Detroit v. Proctor, 61 A.2d 412 (Del. 1948);
Colorado v. Harbeck, 133 N.E. 357 (1921); Bullen v. Her Majesty's Gov't of the
U.K., 553 So.2d 1344 (1989).
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Annotated" and the Restatement on the Law of Foreign Relations
(the Restatement). 2 The Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Rec-
ognition Act provides, with limited exceptions, that all foreign rulings
are conclusive between parties. 3 Section 1(2) of the Act specifically
limits the definition of these alien decisions to those other than that
for taxes.14 As of 1992, twenty-two states have adopted this Act. 5
The Restatement provides that courts are not required to acknowledge
foreign adjudications for the collection of revenues. 6
Continued adherence to the revenue rule has been questioned on
several occasions.' 7 This article will first examine the arguments both
for and against the revenue rule and conclude that contemporary
United States interests would be served best if the policy were relaxed
to permit enforcement of final foreign tax judgments. Next, it will
explore options concerning which law should govern the recognition
of these tax rulings and propose a solution.
II. ARGUMENTS AGAINST LIMITING THE REVENUE RULE
The considerations moderating against limiting the revenue rule to
provide recognition of foreign tax decrees, while myriad, generally
have been discussed in actions for enforcement in American courts
of foreign or sister state taxes or the tax laws themselves, 8 or other
fiscal debts, 9 or rulings discussing the admissibility of defenses to
" UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3, 13 U.L.A. 265 (1986)
[hereinafter FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS].
12 RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 483 (1986).
'3 FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS, § 3, 13 U.L.A. 265 (1986).
14 FOREIGN MONEY JUDGEMENTS, § 1(2), 13 U.L.A. 265 (1986).
11 These states are Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mex-
ico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and Wash-
ington. FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS, § 3; 13 U.L.A. 265 (1986).
16 RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 483.
11 RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 483 reporter's note 2; Arthur T. von Mehren
& Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a
Suggested Approach, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1601 (1968); Richard E. Smith, Note, The
Nonrecognition of Foreign Tax Judgments: International Tax Evasion, 1981 U. ILL.
L. REv. 241 (1981); Banco Frances E Brasileiro S.A. v. Doe, 331 N.E. 2d 502
(1935); see also L.F.E. Goldie, Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International, Vol.
57, Tomes I and I Session d'Oslo 1977. Travaux preparatoires, 74 AM. J. INT'L
L. 476 (1980) (book review) (noting book's criticism of the "anachronistic principle"
that nations are internationally prevented from asserting claims based on their own
public law, including that jurisdiction's tax law).
11 Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1929).
19 Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. A.C. Israel Commodity Co., 190 N.E.2d 235 (N.Y.
1963).
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litigation arising out of foreign revenue laws. 20 With the exception
of Her Magesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British Co-
lumbia v. Gilbertson,2' there have not been any suits in the United
States to recognize a final judgment for taxes rendered abroad. Gil-
bertson appears to remain the single case in the United States that
has directly addressed enforcement of an assessment adjudication.
However, Gilbertson's adoption of the revenue rule should not be
viewed as definitive on the issue of the recognition of foreign tax
judgments since it arose well after the domestic development and
adoption of the rule in the context of the enforcement of tax laws
or other debts, rather than in the context of final judgments.
The primary reasons advanced for the continuance of the revenue
rule in connection with judgments for levies are: (1) the belief that
historical precedent weighed against recognizing alien revenue laws; 22
(2) the belief that tax rulings are similar to traditionally unenforced
penal laws; 23 and, (3) as illustrated by Judge Learned Hand's con-
curring opinion in Moore v. Mitchell,24 that while states are reluctant
to enforce a ruling which conflicts with their own public policy,
judicial scrutiny of foreign law is incompatibly injurious to inter-
national relations. 25 An examination of these arguments, in view of
10 Ludlow v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns. 94 (N.Y. 1806).
21 597 F.2d 1161.
n Id.
23 E.g., Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir, 1929) (Hand, J. concurring);
Banco Frances E Brasileiro v. Doe, 331 N.E.2d 502 (N.Y. 1935); State ex rel. Okla.
Tax Comm'n v. Rodgers, 193 S.W. 2d 919 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946); City of Detroit
v. Proctor, 61 A.2d 412 (Del. 1948).
24 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929) (Hand, J., concurring).
2 See also Proctor, 61 A.2d at 412; Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the
Province of B.C. v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1979). The Gilbertson court
also advanced two other reasons in support of the revenue rule. First, that the
judicial branch as a whole was not the proper forum in which to modify the revenue
rule. Any such revision of policy was essentially a political decision, and should be
left to appropriate legislation making branches of government. 597 F.2d 1161. The
second reason rested on reciprocity concerns in that Canada failed to recognize
United States tax judgments. However, a requirement for this type of reciprocity
has steadily lost favor as a basis for denial of validation since its introduction in
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1894), and is now rarely endorsed. See Somportex
Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1017 (1972); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 481 reporter's note 1.
In Hilton, the United States Supreme Court, refused to enforce a judgment issued
in France against an United States national because, in part, French policy generally
forbade acknowledgement of a similar American decision. The court found that
since recognition of foreign adjudications was based on the concept of "comity of
nations," true comity required equality, and consequently, reciprocity was an essential
element. 159 U.S. at 140.
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present day considerations, throws their validity into question.
A. Why Historical Justification is Not Sufficient
Maintaining the revenue ruling for historical reasons is unpersuasive
in light of the circumstances which gave birth to the rule. The
economic conditions underlying the creation of the revenue rule no
longer exist, and even at the time of its inception, did not dictate
that final tax judgments should be included within its purvey.
The revenue rule traces its formation to England during the height
of mercantilism in the eighteenth century. This period was highlighted
by intense commercial rivalry between nations, epitomized by the
struggle between Great Britain and France. 26 British political and
economic policy was characterized by the promotion, sustenance, and
extension of English commerce. 27 One avenue England used in ob-
taining an advantage in this competition was its development of
extremely nationalistic legal and tax structures, part and parcel of
which was the revenue rule. The rule supported these domestic policies
because the end result of an English court refusing acknowledgment
of a foreign revenue law was often to promote British trade that
would otherwise have been unlawful. 28 For example, the English court
could hold a contract for the purchase or sale of goods valid despite
a foreign revenue statute rendering it void on the grounds that British
courts exclude recognition of foreign revenue laws. As a result, alien
revenue laws were viewed as inherently repressive. 29
Specifically, the rule first appeared in a series of early English
cases, including Attorney General v. Lutwydge, 0 Boucher v. Law-
son,3 Holman v. Johnson,32 and Planche v. Fletcher.3 In these initial
26 Recent Case, Canadian Court Will Not Entertain Suit to Enforce United States
Tax Judgment, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1327, 1328 (1964) [hereinafter Canadian Court].
27 J.M. ROBERTS, THE PELICAN HISTORY OF THE WORLD 625 (Penguin Books 1980)
(1976).
28 Canadian Court, supra note 27, at 1328.
29 Id.
30 145 Eng. Rep. 674 (Ex. 1729). In Lutwydge, the court considered whether a
bond executed in Scotland was within its jurisdiction.
11 95 Eng. Rep. 53 (K.B. 1779). In Boucher, the captain of a ship transporting
Portuguese gold to England in violation of the laws of Portugal, claimed that he
could retain the gold according to custom. The owner of the gold sued the ship's
owner who asserted that the only action lay against the captain.
32 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K.B. 1775). The defendant in Holman challenged the verdict
in favor of the plaintiff in the underlying suit. The defendant argued that a contract
to purchase tea from the plaintiff in France was illegal, and therefore voidable,
because the plaintiff was aware that defendant intended to smuggle the tea into
19921
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actions, the issues before the court generally concerned the effect of
foreign revenue laws on the validity of private commercial contracts.
Parties in these suits often tried to avoid performance of a trade
contract by arguing that the agreement was void based on its violation
of foreign law. By refusing to examine the alien legislation, and hence
finding the contract valid, English courts were in essence promoting
British commerce. 34
The most well-known and frequently cited of the early English
cases, Holman v. Johnson,3 is typical of this type of action. In
Holman, a French plaintiff brought suit to recover on a contract to
sell tea to the defendant in France, while aware that the defendant
intended to smuggle the tea into England in violation of British
import rules. In dismissing the defendant's claim that the agreement
was illegal, Lord Mansfield held that the defendant had acted solely
in France, and that foreign legislation was inapplicable "[flor no
country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of another. '36
In a similar case, Boucher v. Lawson, 37 the plaintiff arranged to
ship a cargo of Portuguese gold to England in violation of the laws
of Portugal. After the vessel arrived in London, the captain refused
to deliver the freight to the plaintiff, asserting that when the gold
was illegally transported from Portugal to Great Britain, it was cus-
tomary for the ship's master to retain the gold for his own. The
plaintiff, however, sued only the ship's owner who argued that any
action properly lay against only the captain.
The importance of this case is shown in several comments which
exemplify how the revenue rule worked to sustain vital British com-
merce. The Court initially noted that "[tihis case seemed at the trial
of very great consequence, as it concerns on the one side, one of
England in violation of British law. The court denied defendant's request for a new
trial because the parties had acted solely in France.
" 99 Eng. Rep. 164 (K.B. 1779); see infra text accompanying note 35.
14 Planche, 99 Eng. Rep. 164 (K.B. 1779), does, however, vary somewhat from
this type of factual pattern. In Planche, the plaintiff insured goods on board a
vessel which sailed from London to France. The ship, however, was cleared for
Belgium. At the time, England and France were at war, and the craft was captured.
The plaintiff sued the underwriters, who defended on the ground that the clearance
of the vessel for Ostend was fraudulent since that was never its intended port. The
court held for the plaintiff on the grounds that this was the common, widely known
practice of the trade.
15 98 Eng. Rep. at 1120.
316 Id. at 1121.
37 95 Eng. Rep. 53 (K.B. 1734).
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the most beneficial branches of the English trade, as it relates to the
security that persons have in the trusting their gold on board English
ships ... (emphasis added)." 3 In asserting that Portugal's export
laws should have no effect on the issue of whether liability exists
against the captain or the defendant, the opinion continued:
The carrying on, indeed, of a trade prohibited by the laws of England
is of material consequence, and it is said that the parties in that
case shall receive no relief, as they are both participes criminis ...
But if it should be laid down, that because goods are prohibited
to be exported by the laws of any foreign country from whence
they are brought, therefore the parties should have no remedy or
action here, it would cut off all benefit of such trade from this
kingdom, which would be of very bad consequence to the principle
and most beneficial branches of our trade .... 9
At the same time as British courts completed the development of
the revenue rule in this line of cases, the United States declared its
independence from England. Notwithstanding this newfound inde-
pendence, individual states adopted the English revenue rule policy
wholesaleA° State courts initially interpreted the revenue rule to bar
enforcement of sister state tax judgments. However, the Supreme
Court ruled in 1935 that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
United States Constitution required acknowledgement of these as-
sessment decisions. 4' The states remained free, however, to individ-
ually evaluate whether or not to entertain actual suits to recover taxes
levied under the statutes of another state, or to' recognize revenue
laws of another jurisdiction. 42 The recent trend continues toward
recognition of sister state tax claims. Some states have enacted statues
requiring reciprocal enforcement, 43 while others simply acknowledge
31 Id. at 55.
39 Id. at 55-56 (emphasis added).
40 For a thorough history of the revenue rule and its adoption by individual U.S.
states, see State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Rodgers, 193 S.W.2d 919 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1946).
41 Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
42 E.g., White, 296 U.S. at 268; City of Philadelphia v. Cohen, 184 N.E. 2d 167
(N.Y. 1962), cert. denied 371 U.S. 934 (1962); City of Detroit v. Proctor, 61 A.2d
412 (1948); Colorado v. Harbeck, 133 N.E. 357 (1921); Rodgers, 193 S.W.2d at
919.
41 An example of a state codified reciprocity statute is Mo. REV. STAT. § 143.871
(1990), which provides:
Income tax claims of other states
1. The courts of this state shall recognize and enforce liabilities for income
1992]
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these tax claims on the grounds of "comity" and "justice.""
Individual states also embraced the English revenue rule in -regard
to foreign, rather than sister state, claims for taxes or final adju-
dications. The first United States case to follow the British doctrine
in regard to a foreign claim for taxes was Ludlow v. Van Rensselaer.45
As in the older English suits, Ludlow did not concern enforcement
of a tax judgment. Rather, the tribunal simply sought to promote
commerce by refusing to find that a French promissory note was
invalid in the United States, as it would have been under French
revenue rulesA6
This theory that foreign revenue laws were inherently repressive to
the implementing country survived into the modern age. 47 Neverthe-
less, although the United States policy regarding final tax judgments
is rooted in the early English revenue cases,4 no United States court
expressly acknowledged the revenue rule's application to foreign tax
adjudications until the Gilbertson case in 1979.49 Gilbertson denied
taxes lawfully imposed by any other state which extends a like comity to
this state, and the duly authorized officer of any such state may sue for
the collection of such a tax in the courts of this state.
See also OR. REv. STAT. § 118.810 (1991) which affords reciprocal enforcement of
foreign death taxes. For a comprehensive discussion of interstate treatment of sister
state tax claims in the United States, see generally Smith, supra note 17, at 253-55.
See, for example, Rodgers, 193 S.W.2d at 919, 927 where the court concluded
after a review of historical and public policy considerations that there was "no valid
justification for not permitting a suit in [Missouri] for a tax lawfully levied by
another [state]. The simplest ideas of comity would seem to compel such a result."
Both Ohio v. Arnett, 234 S.W.2d 722 (Ky. 1950) and Buckley v. Huston, 291 A.2d
129 (N.J. 1972) followed the Rodgers decision.
41 1 Johns. 94 (N.Y. 1806). Ludlow expressly adopted the English revenue rule
in noting that "[ijf a contract, on the face of it, appears to be valid, our courts
will not undertake to enforce the revenue laws of a foreign country by declaring it
void." Id. at 95.
- Id.
41 Banco Do Brasil S.A. v. A.C. Israel Commodity Co., 190 N.E.2d 235 (N.Y.
1963); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 448 (1964) (White, J.,
dissenting) (both noting that no country has an obligation to further the governmental
interests of another foreign sovereignty by enforcing the alien penal and revenue
legislation).
41 Current opinions still often cite directly to the early English cases. See, e.g.,
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of B.C. v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d
1161 (9th Cir. 1979); City of Detroit v. Proctor, 61 A.2d 412 (Del. 1948); State ex
rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Rodgers, 193 S.W.2d 919 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946). See also
the British and Canadian cases in Government of India v. Taylor, [1955] App. Cas.
491 (appeal taken from H.L. (E)) and United States v. Harden, 1963 S.C.R. 366
(Can. 1963).
59 Gilbertson, 597 F.2d at 1161.
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recognition, in part, due to the long standing survival of the rule.5 0
From an historical perspective, then, there is a strong argument
that the United States adherence to the revenue rule is not well-
founded. United States courts recognize that the principle was de-
veloped to promote Britain's eighteenth century nationalistic policies.'
While the rule's value may have been apparent in the eighteenth
century - when refusal to acknowledge foreign laws resulted in a
gain of local economic prominence - modern commercial consid-
erations dictate otherwise.
With the world's economies now far more intertwined and inter-
dependent, the health of one country depends in great measure on
that of others.5 2 When one nation experiences a significant decrease
in commercial activity, such as a recession, the world economy is
affected adversely. For example, importing territories to which the
so Gilbertson observed in its conclusion that "[tlhe revenue rule has been with
us for centuries and as such has become firmly embedded in the law. There were
sound reasons which supported its original adoption, and there remain sound reasons
supporting its continued validity." Id. at 1166.
Gilbertson also cited a fear of impermissible interference with international affairs,
along with a lack of reciprocal recognition of American tax judgments by Canada
as further support for its exclusion. Id. These concerns will be discussed in §C infra
in this article.
The opinion in the underlying Oregon district court decision in Gilbertson, likewise,
acknowledged the importance of the rule's longevity. It indicated that the recognition
of foreign country judgments was:
... one of first impression. Apparently this is first time in American legal
history that a foreign government has sought enforcement of a tax judgment
in a court of the United States. The best explanation for this seems to be
that the 'well established rule' that it cannot be done has deterred all
attempts.
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of B.C. v. Gilbertson, 433 F. Supp.
410, 411 (D. Or. 1977).
11 This concept was alluded to in State ex rel. Olka. Tax Comm'n v. Rodgers,
193 S.W. 2d 919 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946), where the court, after examining the early
British cases, commented that:
in each case the question presented was whether a contract made to evade
a foreign revenue law or which did not comply with the revenue laws of
the locus contractus, was enforceable in England; and, in each case, the
ruling was based upon a desire to promote commercial convenience.
Id. at 922.
Rodgers further buttressed its decision not to extend the revenue rule to sister
state tax claims with the note that the doctrine "was the product of the commercial
world, and arose at a time where there was great commercial rivalry and international
suspicion." Id. at 924.
52 See Economic Report of the President (Feb. 1992), Tables B-102, B-103 which
demonstrate the dramatic increase of merchandise importations into the United States
from countries throughout the world, as well as United States exports abroad.
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United States exports its products can no longer afford to purchase
United States goods. 3 Particularly in a recessionary period, the rest
of the world's ability to absorb United States exports is critical. The
substantial increase in domestic exportation within the last ten years
has been essential in enabling the United States to lessen its current
account deficit and to reach its present balance of payments.14 Thus,
the effect of the revenue rule as a whole to encourage domestic
commerce at the expense of other jurisdictioni arguably has the long-
term harmful effect of reducing United States markets abroad.
Additionally, the expansion of the revenue rule itself from its
original premise of excluding evidence of foreign revenue laws which
encouraged domestic commerce to prohibiting recognition of final
tax decrees is historically unwarranted. 5 Whether or not a sovereign
See Export Trends: Mulford Says Slowdown in U.S. Exports Due to Slower
Growth of Trading Partners, INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), at 1645 (Nov. 13, 1991)
which assessed the importance of exports to the health and development of the
American economy. The article indicated that "a slowdown in the economies of the
major U.S. trading partners ... has held down sales this year." Accord, Sylvia
Nasar, World's Appetite for U.S. Products is Still Increasing, N.Y. TldEs, Nov.
11, 1991, at Al. In addition to describing the detrimental effect on U.S. exports
due to the international recession, the commentary further illustrated the present
day interdependency of the world's countries. The article discussed several economies
which have shown improvement, and noted that "the mere fact that lots of countries
are getting richer and more sophisticated means that they now want-and can afford-
American brands." Id. at D2 (quoting Stephen M. Peterson, vice president at
Giddings & Lewis, a domestic machine tool manufacturer).
Conversely, for an example of the effect of the 1990-1991 commercial downturn
on another nation's economy, see Sebastian Moffett, U.S. Recession Pulls Profits
Down at Japanese Electronic Companies, S.F. SUN. ExAM. & CHRON., Oct. 27,
1991, at E-13, where the injury to Japan's electronic industry which historically
exported 70 percent of its computer chip production was evaluated.
1' Economic Report of the President, supra note 52, Table B-100, B-102, and B-
103.
" See Rodgers, 193 S.W.2d at 919, which questioned the expansion of the revenue
rule to exclusion of tax decrees. Rodgers stated that the principle as set forth in
the early British cases:
has been applied to situations far beyond the probable anticipation of those
learned judges. The [doctrine] did not originate with cases involving an
attempt to collect a tax, but had its inception in cases raising the question
of whether a contract which did not comply with the revenue laws of the
place where made was enforceable in the courts of the forum. Considerations
of commercial convenience led to its adoption. The next step was to apply
it to suits brought to collect a tax, but, in doing so, the courts have, [with
one exception], merely repeated the time-worn axiom, without considering
whether the reasons which made it desirable to apply it to the early cases
were applicable to the new situation presented.
Id. at 926.
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state gives conclusive effect to a final foreign assessment decision
(such as that for income, property, or inheritance taxes), it is doubtful
that business in that state is affected, much less encouraged. More-
over, it is particularly irrelevant to the type of trade that formed the
linchpin for the development of the revenue rule: commerce which
would have been illegal under the levying jurisdiction.
B. Penal Legislation Is Critically Dissimilar
The second approach forums have traditionally employed when
reiterating their continued allegiance to the revenue rule is to analogize
to, or even wholly justify the rule by, the similar but rarely questioned
"penal law exception." This exception provides that foreign penal
laws, whether of a sister state or another country, are never enforced.16
However, this comparison with penal legislation presents an imprecise
view of the relationship between revenue laws and penal laws, which
impairs any analysis involving the recognition of foreign tax adju-
dications.
It has been frequently noted that there is an intrinsic difference
between revenue and penal judgments. In State ex rel. Okla. Tax
Comm'n v. Rodgers, the court stated: "A penal law is punitive in
nature, while a revenue law defines the extent of the citizen's pecuniary
obligations to the state, and provides a remedy for its collection. '5 7
Additionally, the Restatement defines a penal decision as primarily
punitive rather than compensatory in nature 8 and a revenue ruling
as one "in favor of a foreign state ... based on a claim for an
assessment of a tax."5 9 In evaluating whether a sister state judgment
for levies must be recognized, the Supreme Court has indicated that
the obligation to pay taxes is not penal in nature but is rather a
"statutory liability, quasi-contractual in nature".6
In Rodgers,6' the court emphasized that the major reasons for
declining to enforce penal rulings were the "sovereign nature of
56 See Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929); Banco Frances E
Brasileiro S.A. v. Doe, 331 N.E.2d 502 (N.Y. 1935); Rodgers, 193 S.W.2d at 919;
City of Detroit v. Proctor, 61 A.2d 412 (Del. 1948).
11 193 S.W.2d at 926. While Rodgers made this observation in the context of
whether sister state tax claims should be recognized, the reasoning applies equally
to international rulings.
38 RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 483 cmt. b.
19 Id. § 483 cmt. c.
'o Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 271 (1935).
61 State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Rodgers, 193 S.W.2d 919 (Mo. Ct. App.
1946).
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independent states" along with "the fear that the enforcement of
penal laws of another state would be considered an interference with
the prerogatives of that state, which might produce disagreeable
international complications. 62 These concerns are not readily relevant
in the revenue sphere. Unlike a penal action, in a revenue action the
foreign sovereign state itself sues for recovery on the judgment in
the recognizing forum. No "unwarranted interference with the prer-
ogatives of the foreign state" occurs because the foreign government
is the "motivating party asking for relief and undertaking to submit
itself to the jurisdiction of the [other] state." '63
Courts have refused to enforce penal rulings of foreign states on
other grounds, including the non-availability in the enforcing juris-
diction of a remedy equivalent to that in the original forum, and
the doctrine of retributive justice which provides that the state whose
laws were violated and the punishing nation must be the same. 64 Both
of these considerations are extraneous to tax decisions since the
equivalent remedy-a money judgment-is obviously available, and
revenue laws are theoretically not enacted to punish citizens.65
The Rodgers court noted additional reasons for excluding penal
adjudications, including inconvenience to the defendant by being
forced to appear in an alien jurisdiction as well as excessive burden
placed on the enforcing state since it must conduct the trial in another
location. 66 However, these hindrances have been generally regarded
as superfluous in revenue adjudications because they are "common
to all transitory civil actions and have never been considered as a
reason to bar them," and because the delinquent taxpayer chose to
leave the more convenient home forum. 67 Moreover, the implementing
state does not really suffer harm, because it receives the monetary
benefit when its own tax judgments are recognized in other juris-
dictions.
C. International Affairs are Not Unduly Affected
United States tribunals refuse to give conclusive effect to any type
of decision issued abroad if it conflicts with the public policy of that
62 Id. at 926.
63 Id.
64 Id.
61 Id. at 926; Buckley v. Huston, 60 N.J. 472, 291 A.2d 129 (1972).
6 Id.
67 Id. See also Buckley v. Huston, 60 N.J. 472, 291 A.2d 129 (1972) where the
court permitted the City of Philadelphia to bring an action to recover wage taxes.
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enforcing jurisdiction.68 Additionally, jurisdictions place further limits
by declining legitimacy where "the cause of action on which the
judgment was based is repugnant to [the relevant] public policy" .69
These public policy concerns can be divided into two categories: the
relationship of tax judgments as a whole to relevant policy and specific
injurious effects created by the application itself of the civic analysis.
In respect to the first consideration, Gilbertson suggests that any
validation given to a revenue assessment ruling would "have the
effect of furthering the governmental interests of a foreign country,
something which our courts customarily refuse to do." ' 70 In forming
this contention, the Gilbertson court relied primarily on Justice White's
dissent in Banco Nacionel de Cuba v. Sabbatino,71 the decision which
is considered the parent of the modern Act of State doctrine. 72 The
66 See Stein v. Siegel, 377 N.Y.S. 2d 580, 50 A.D.2d 916 (1975) where a plaintiff
filed a personal injury action for injuries suffered in Austria against an American
defendant in both Austria and New York. The plaintiff later discontinued the Austrian
action. However, Austrian law provided that filing of the discontinuance waived all
further claims against the defendant. The New York court denied defendant's motion
to dismiss the complaint on the grounds it was barred by virtue of the Austrian
statute. The court held that a "foreign country judgment will not be recognized by
our courts insofar as it contravenes the public policy of this state." Id. at 582,
citations omitted. Because such a discontinuance was without prejudice under New
York law, the court held that the action was not barred. Accord Somportex Ltd.
v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1017 (1972), Neporany v. Kir, 173 N.Y.S.2d (N.Y. App. Div. 1958); see also
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 482(2)(d); FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS § 4(3), 13
U.L.A. 268 (1986).
69 RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 482; see also FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS §
4(3), 13 U.L.A. 268 (1986). For examples of causes of actions repugnant to public
policy, see Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 318 F. Supp. 161
(E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017
(1972) where the court noted that Pennsylvania's public policy considerations would
likely prevent the enforcement of judgments involving "unreasonable restraints of
marriage or of trade, collusive arrangements for obtaining divorces, suppression of
bids for public contracts, interference with freedom of conscience or religion." Id.
at 169, (citation omitted). (For a discussion of the facts of Somportex, see infra
text accompanying note 88.) See also, Restatement, supra note 1, § 482, reporter's
note 1, which provides that "a judgment in implementation of racial laws would
be denied recognition or enforcement in the United States."
70 Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of B.C. v. Gilbertson, 597
F.2d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 1979).
7, Id. at 1164 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)
(White, J., dissenting)).
72 In Sabbatino, the owners of a Cuban sugar estate, which had been expropriated
by the government of Cuba, brought an action in New York for title to sugar
exported from their estate. The United States Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's
argument that Cuba's seizure of the estate was contrary to international law because
the Act of State doctrine precluded review of Cuba's expropriation done within its
own territory. Id. at 398.
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Act of State doctrine, as outlined in Sabbatino, prevents any inquiry
into the validity of a foreign sovereign's taking of property within
its own country, and, in limited circumstances, it prevents scrutiny
of the sovereign's acts done within its own territory and applicable
in that country. 73
In his dissenting opinion, Justice White argued that foreign law
should not remain immune from examination in certain circumstances.
In noting that international law was historically open to scrutiny, he
pointed out that United States courts refuse to enforce foreign laws,
including revenue legislation, for public policy reasons "since no
country has an obligation to further the governmental interests of a
foreign sovereign." 74
The majority opinion, however, rejected Justice White's position
and determined that under the Act of State doctrine foreign law
remains sacrosanct. As a result, when the United States gives effect
to another jurisdiction's laws by virtue of the Act of State doctrine,
it frequently aids the other nation's concerns. Moreover, many United
States courts traditionally find no problem entertaining decisions
71 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 398. For a comprehensive discussion of the Act of
State doctrine, see RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 443 and accompanying text.
The actual nexus between the revenue rule and the Act of State doctrine has not
been frequently considered. In the past, it was unnecessary for courts to determine
whether a foreign tax decree fell within the doctrine's protected "governmental acts"
because the foreign revenue rule itself forbade enforcement of any revenue-related
law or judgment. However, the issue could arise in the event the rule were relaxed
to permit recognition of foreign tax decrees. Conceivably, the tax evader may assert
that United States law requires a public policy analysis before validating alien
decisions. Since the Act of State doctrine precludes just this type of inspection, tax
decrees should remain unenforceable. Alternatively, the foreign jurisdiction might
contend that a revenue judgment is a protected "act" performed within its home
territory and applicable there. Therefore, while the ruling must be entertained, a
public policy examination may not be performed because the Act of State doctrine
prevents this inquiry.
Use of the Act of State doctrine in either of these hypotheticals is unwarranted,
however, because tax decrees are not the class of "act" meant to be shielded by
the doctrine. The Restatement notes that whether a particular act of a foreign nation
falls within the doctrine's parameters "depends on the extent to which adjudication
of the challenge would require the United States court to consider the propriety of
the acts and policies, or probe the motives, of the foreign government." RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 1, § 443 cmt. c. As extensively discussed later in this section of
this article, any evaluation of foreign policies that may arise would be limited in
scope to a traditionally permissible level, rendering the doctrine inapplicable.
14 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 448 (White, J., dissenting).
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which directly benefit other governments. For example, many juris-
dictions enforce foreign orders for payment of court costs which were
incurred during litigation in that country. 5
In addition, a review of other aspects within the international affairs
arena suggests that Gilbertson's theory that the mere acknowledge-
ment of tax judgments, in effect, would controvert relevant public
policy is not universally revered. The overall concept of enforcement
of tax adjudications from other nations is not without precedence in
the United States. The United States is a party to several, albeit
older, bilateral treaties for the avoidance of double taxation in con-
nection with various types of taxes. In these treaties, the United
States, in effect, gives limited recognition to certain foreign revenue
judgments 76 or even agrees under narrow circumstances to aid in the
collection of taxes.77
Further, most taxes on their own rarely conflict with the enforcing
state's public policy since virtually all sovereigns impose levies. 78
Moreover, a refusal to enforce revenue rulings allows the delinquent
taxpayer to obtain the benefit of the assessing institution while avoid-
ing the cost of its maintenance.7 9 As a result, the recognition of a
foreign tax decision would generally not controvert a state's public
policies because it serves a goal shared by both the taxing and
71 E.g., Indiana Refining Co. v. Valvoline Oil Co., 75 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1935);
Coulborn v. Joseph, 25 S.E.2d 576 (Ga. 1943).
76 See Convention and Protocol Respecting Double Taxation, Mar. 23, 1939,
U.S.-Swed., art. XVII, 54 Stat. 1759, 1770-71, where the contracting states agreed
to "lend assistance and support in the collection of the taxes." Further, applications
for enforcement of taxes or revenue claims which are "finally determined" shall be
"accepted for enforcement by the other contracting State and collected in that State
in accordance with the laws applicable to the enforcement and collection of its own
taxes.''
The United States has entered into similar treaties with Denmark, France, and
the Netherlands. See Convention Respecting Double Taxation and Taxes on Income,
May 6, 1948, U.S.-Den., art. XVIII, 62 Stat. 1730, 1736; Convention Between the
United States of America and the French Republic with Respect to Taxes on Income
and Property, July 28, 1967, U.S.-Fr., art. 27, 19 U.S.T. 5280, 5314-15; Convention
Respecting Double Taxation and Taxes on Income, Apr. 29, 1948, U.S.-Neth., art.
XXII, 62 Stat. 1757, 1766.
77 See e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to
Taxes on Income, July 22, 1954, U.S.-F.R.G., art. XVI, para. 2, 5 U.S.T. 2768,
2802.
71 RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 483, reporter's note 2.
79 City of Detroit v. Proctor, 61 A.2d 412 (Del. 1948); State ex rel. Okla. Tax
Comm'n v. Rodgers, 193 S.W.2d 919 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946).
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enforcing jurisdictions: ensuring that those who receive the forum's
advantages pay for them.
The dissimilarity between penal and revenue laws also illustrates
why the notion that the enforcement of final tax judgments, like
most other types of non-tax rulings, is not antithetical to the public
policies of most territories. The burden on the levying nation of
conducting its trial elsewhere is not unfair since the country itself
submits to the recognizing jurisdiction when it brings the action in
that forum.80 Nor is the taxpayer unacceptably inconvenienced by
appearing in an alien tribunal because the delinquent subject pre-
sumably left the assessing forum voluntarily."' Due to the fact that
all relevant aspects of the underlying tax could be challenged in the
home country, the taxpayer's available defenses and remedies are not
restricted.8
2
The second category of public policy considerations underlying the
non-recognition of final tax adjudications is the fear that the public
policy analysis itself would involve the enforcing state too closely in
the internal processes of the taxing location.83 This concern has not
-o Should the taxing state determine that the cost or inconvenience of bringing
the action in tht enforcing jurisdiction is unreasonable, that jurisdiction may simply
choose not to pursue the suit.
1 See Rodgers, 193 S.W. at 919, which provides that most inconveniences that
occur to a party compelled to conduct a defense in a foreign jurisdiction "have
never been considered as a reason to bar" the action. Id. at 927.
82 For example, a taxpayer could challenge the amount of tax assessed, the basis
of the levy, or the legitimacy of the tax. See, e.g., Her Majesty the Queen in Right
of the Province of B.C. v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1979) (defendant
successfully contested the amount of tax due in the assessing location of Canada
and received a levy reduction); Benaglia v. Commission, 36 B.T.A. 838 (1937)
(plaintiff challenged whether a hotel manager's meals were properly taxed as income);
Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1982) (plaintiff objected to
denial by Internal Revenue Service of tax-exempt status).
If the enforcing state determined that an objection to an aspect of the tax, such
as the amount, could not be made in the home country, the taxpayer could assert
that the judgment should not be enforced in the recognizing United States court.
The taxpayer could argue that the denial of the ability to challenge that portion of
the tax was significant, and the underlying decision was therefore rendered in "judicial
system that does not provide . . . procedures compatible with due process of law."
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 482(l)(a). See also discussion contained in section
III, infra, of this article, which provides guidelines for the non-recognition of rulings
that do not comport with United States principles of due process.
83 A cognizance that enforcement affects international affairs can even be dated
to the seminal case of Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), which noted that
enforceability is a matter of "comity of nations". Id. at 163.
This belief that review of final tax adjudications would involve the enforcing state
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proven as worrisome as it may appear. It is arguable that in submitting
themselves to the laws of the implementing state, any attendant
interference in related foreign affairs is implicitly accepted when
another country asks for relief.s4
The reasoning in Moore that a "scrutiny of the [tax] liability"8
underlying the ruling could impermissibly intrude into foreign rela-
tions loses some persuasiveness because it is discussed in the context
of the application of foreign revenue laws rather than final judgments.
The necessary examination of relevant foreign policies involved in
recognizing a final tax decision is far less intrusive than that required
to implement an alien revenue law. Unlike implementing an alien
revenue law, when a United States court acknowledges an adjudication
rendered abroad it does not require one state to administer the
complex tax system of another. The Court must simply determine
whether the nature of the assessment is contrary to its own civic
policies or fundamental notions of decency and justice.86
too closely in the affairs of the taxing nation is best illustrated by the Gilbertson
tribunal's application of the reasoning in Judge Learned Hand's concurrence in
Moore v. Mitchell to the international arena.
Judge Hand argued in Moore that a strong foundation for the revenue rule existed:
While the origin of the exception in the case of penal liabilities does not
appear in the books, a sound basis for it exists, in my judgment, which
includes liabilities for taxes as well. Even in the case of ordinary municipal
liabilities, a court will not recognize those arising in a foreign state, if they
run counter to the "settled public policy" of its own. Thus a scrutiny of
the liability is necessarily always in reserve, and the possibility that it will
be found not to accord with the policy of the domestic state. This is not
a troublesome or delicate inquiry when the question arises between private
persons, but it takes on quite another face when it concerns the relations
between the foreign state and its own citizens or even those who may be
temporarily within its borders. To pass upon the provisions for the public
order of another state is, or at any rate should be, beyond the powers of
a court; it involves the relations between the states themselves, with which
courts are incompetent to deal, and which are intrusted to other authorities.
It may commit the domestic state to a position which would seriously
embarrass its neighbor. Revenue laws fall within the same reasoning; they
affect a state in matters as vital to its existence as its criminal laws. No
court ought to undertake an inquiry which it cannot prosecute without
determining whether those laws are consonant with its own notions of what
is proper.
Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929) (Hand, J. concurring).
', See State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Rodgers, 193 S.W.2d 919 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1946).
11 Moore, 30 F.2d at 604.
16 RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 482 cmt. f; Willis L.M. Reese, The Status in
This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 783 (1950).
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Moreover, the public policy inquiry engaged in by enforcing ju-
risdiction is narrow and few decisions "fall within the category of
judgments that need not be recognized because they violate the public
policy of the forum. 8 7 Courts have generally granted effect to ad-
judications even though the enforcing state may not provide recovery
on, or has affirmatively rejected, the underlying cause of action."8
The fact that any encroachment into international affairs which
may actually exist is relatively minor and tolerable is illustrated in
another framework as well. There is a strong argument that an inquiry
into whether an alien tax judgment is repugnant to the public policy
of the forum is no more intrusive into foreign relations than that
frequently involved, and sanctioned, every time a non-tax decision
is considered for recognition.
Public policy evaluations in non-tax actions permit a court to refuse
to validate repugnant decisions,8 9 thereby giving judicial leeway to
deny application of foreign decrees90 When refusing recognition on
public policy grounds, the tribunal may in fact be excluding a suit,
for example, where another sovereignty itself was a party. The ju-
risdiction may be passing judgment on another government's legal
system itself by denying recovery for specific causes of actions of
which it does not approve. 9' Such ability to pick and choose no doubt
87 RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 482 reporter's note 1; von Mehren & Trautman,
supra note 17.
11 See, for example, Neporany v. Kir, 173 N.Y.S.2d (N.Y. App. Div. 1958) where
the New York court permitted enforcement of a Canadian money judgment based
on causes of action for seduction and criminal conversion barred by New York
statutes because the claims were "recognized in the jurisdiction where the acts took
place, and the comity of nations calls for giving full effect to this foreign judgment."
Id. at 147. See also Spann v. Compania Mexicana Radiodifusora Fronteriza, 41 F.
Supp. 907 (N.D. Tex 1941), aff'd, 131 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1942). In Spann, the court
affirmed enforcement of a Mexican judgment for costs calculated at a rate of 12
percent even though the defendant asserted the amount of costs awarded was "grossly
excessive in light of, and obnoxious to, the public policy of Texas." Id. at 609.
Accord Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 318 F.Supp. 161 (E.D.
Pa. 1970), aff'd 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir.1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 1017 (1972). In
Somportex, the court noted in response to defendant's argument that Pennsylvania
did not recognize recovery for loss of good will and attorney fees that "merely
because the forum has a different rule of law, whether legislatively or judicially
founded, does not automatically render the foreign law contrary to the public policy
of the forum." Id. at 168-169 (citations omitted).
19 See supra text accompanying notes 68 and 69.
For a discussion of public policy considerations that prevent recognition, see
supra text accompanying notes 68 and 69.
91 See, for example, Caldwell v. Caldwell, 81 N.E.2d 60 (N.Y. 1948), where the
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results in significant international repercussions which have repeatedly
been deemed acceptable. 92
Further, when analyzing whether to enforce any type of decision,
courts consider several other factors in addition to conducting the
public policy inquiry. 93 These factors, which include investigations of
whether the decree was rendered under a system with impartial tri-
bunals or with procedures compatible with due process of law,9 can
also lead the implementing state to interfere with federal interests in
a seemingly appropriate manner. A jurisdiction may simply view the
case before it as a dispute between two private parties and apply
only its own local public policy concepts, thereby disregarding relevant
national objectives. The investigation may also involve a weighing of
the impartiality or credibility of foreign officials. 95
Likewise, the foreign tribunal's holding itself may implicate inter-
national affairs and recognition nevertheless has been permitted. For
example, if a forum considers a naturalization action, it may have
to determine the effect to be given to a foreign adjudication concerning
the moral character of the petitioner.9
court examined the effect to be given to the Mexican "valueless ... mail order
divorce[]" of the defendant and his previous wife in a New York action for separation
and child support brought by plaintiff, defendant's subsequent wife.
92 For example, a jurisdiction whose decision was declined enforcement may feel
intentionally slighted. The country could view the denial as a politically motivated
statement regarding its legal or governmental system. The jurisdiction could choose
to retaliate and refuse to recognize United States judgments, or it could determine
that political or economic sanctions are appropriate.
91 The enforcing jurisdiction may evaluate whether the foreign court had juris-
diction over the defendant, whether the defendant received sufficient notice of the
proceedings in order to prepare a defense, and whether the judgment was obtained
by fraud. See Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 430 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Cal. 1977),
aff'd, 612 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1980). In Montreal, the court held that a default
judgment for money obtained in Canada could be enforced because the Canadian
court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The defendant had argued that
the claim was invalid because he never appeared in the Canadian proceedings and
had not been served within Canada. See also Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc. v.
Prometco (Produce & Metals) Co., Ltd., 470 F. Supp. 610 (D.C.N.Y. 1979) where
the court noted that a judgment must be obtained by a fraud on the court before
the action will be denied recognition. Accord Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing
Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972). For
an inventory of the other factors considered by courts in determining whether to
enforce a judgment, see RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 482 and FORIGN MONEY
JUDGMENTS § 4, 13 U.L.A. 268 (1986).
94 RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 482(1)(a); FoaIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS § 4(a)(1),
13 U.L.A. 268 (1986).
91 E.g., Caldwell, 81 N.E.2d at 60.
See Courtland H. Peterson, Foreign Country Judgments and the Second Re-
statement of Conflict of Laws, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 220, 238 n.115 (1972).
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Jurisdictional and reciprocal prerequisites to recognition of foreign
rulings also illustrate the depth of impingement into the international
sphere which has been permitted. Courts generally confirm that for-
eign tribunals possess personal jurisdiction over the defendant before
granting a ruling valid in the United States.9 7 In this analysis, the
issues of whether jurisdiction was proper under the home forum's
procedural standards and under United States notions of due process
are examined.9 8 Inherent then is a finding on the merits of other
nations' adjudication methods- an action with clear international
ramifications. Also, those states that require reciprocity" must inquire
into the extent to which the foreign country respects United States
courts' judgments, a determination with similar international reper-
cussions. 100
Not only have individual states accepted that the enforcement of
any type of alien decision may intrude on foreign affairs, but these
effects have been deemed so limited that a national standard for the
recognition of these rulings has never been mandated. 01 States are
91 See Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 430 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd
612 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1980) where the court indicated that a foreign judgment is
not conclusive in California if the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction
over the defendant. Accord Somportex, 318 F. Supp. 161; Hunt v. BP Exploration
Co. (Libya), 492 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Tex. 1980); see also FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS
§ 4, 13 U.L.A. 268 (1986); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 482 (l)(b).
98 In Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya), 492 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Tex. 1980),
the court found that an English judgment against an American citizen barred that
party from bringing a later action in the United States. The court determined that
the English decision was binding because the English tribunal had personal jurisdiction
over the plaintiff as measured by both British and American law. Similarly, in
Somportex, 318 F. Supp. 161, the court granted recognition in Pennsylvania to a
default judgment obtained in England because the American defendant voluntarily
appeared in the British action. The court determined that recognition was appropriate
because the English court had personal jurisdiction in the international sense and
British civil procedure was compatible with United States goals of justice and concepts
of due process. Accord Montreal, 430 F. Supp. 1243; see also FOREIGN MONEY
JUDGMENTS § 4(a), 13 U.L.A. 268 (1986); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 482 (l)(b).
A declining number of jurisdictions mandate that the country issuing the
judgment must reciprocally recognize rulings from the enforcing state before per-
mitting validation of the decision. See supra text accompanying note 25.
100 See supra text accompanying note 25. But see Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S.
429 (1968) (state could not impose reciprocity limitations on the ability of a non-
resident alien to inherit property because it involved the state in foreign affairs).
,01 See supra text accompanying note 7. An example of an impingement into
international affairs caused by the lack of national standards for the recognition of
foreign decisions is shown by the comparison of Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya),
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permitted to individually determine their own specific guidelines for
validation.102
In summary, it is clear that the concept of the recognition of
foreign tax decisions would not be adverse to the public policy of
most jurisdictions. Further, the public policy analysis undertaken by
a forum when determining whether enforcement is appropriate does
not cause an unreasonable interference into foreign affairs. Conse-
quently, public policy considerations should not remain a justification
for the continued refusal to acknowledge foreign tax rulings.
III. WHICH LAW THE COURT SHOULD USE IN ENFORCING TAX
JUDGMENTS
Once a jurisdiction concludes that the reasons barring validation
of foreign tax judgments are insufficient to rationalize continued
adherence to the revenue rule, the forum must next address the issue
of which law should govern the recognition of these tax decisions.
In the United States, modification of the revenue rule should be
limited to permit recognition of final tax decisions issued abroad,
while still excluding actions for the collection of assessments them-
selves, lawsuits involving the use or recognition of alien revenue laws
to limit defenses and suits to facilitate recovery for debts arising out
of other fiscal claims. There is a convincing contention that any
further easing of the revenue rule to permit recognition of these other
actions might run afoul of the Act of State doctrine.103 An investi-
gation into whether to acknowledge a foreign revenue law- versus a
judgment more likely involves an impermissibly intrusive analysis of
foreign motivations and policies.
492 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Tex. 1980) with Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing
Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 1017 (1972). In
Hunt, the recognizing jurisdiction permitted a challenge by the plaintiff to the factual
basis of the issuing court's finding of personal jurisdiction over him, while in
Somportex, the enforcing forum prohibited such an examination.
Nevertheless, some writers have suggested that a national standard is advisable
due to the intrusion into foreign relations. See Robert C. Casad, Issue Preclusion
and Foreign Country Judgments: Whose Law?, 70 IOWA L. REv. 53 (1984); Reese,
supra note 86.
102 See supra text accompanying note 7.
103 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (discussing
the Act of State doctrine).
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In an action to enforce a final tax decree, which is in essence a
proceeding for recovery upon a money judgment, any inquiry into
the validity of the underlying claim is severely limited to two con-
siderations: whether jurisdictional requirements were met and to the
narrow evaluation of public policy considerations. 10 As a result, the
pitfalls involved when United States tribunals are called upon to
enforce foreign tax laws, and thereby administer the complex tax
system of another sovereignty, are avoided and intrusions into in-
ternational affairs are lessened to a satisfactory level.
In assessing whether to entertain a particular final tax adjudication,
tribunals can utilize standard legal principles applicable to the eval-
uation of whether any other type of foreign judgment should be
acknowledged. Although state precepts governing the recognition of
non-United States judgments differ to a certain extent, most subscribe
to similar general tenets. 05 These rules originated in the seminal case
of Hilton v. Guyot."0 Hilton introduced the view that the enforcement
of foreign judgments is based on the concept of "comity", which.
was seen as less than an obligation, but more than mere courtesy.
Comity mandated that underlying rulings must be the result of a full
and fair trial before a court of competent jurisdiction which conducted
the lawsuit in accordance with regular proceedings with due citation
of or voluntary appearance of the defendant. Further, it was deemed
necessary that the trial was managed under a system of jurisprudence
likely to secure an impartial administration of justice between the
citizens of that sovereignty and those of other nations, along with
absence of prejudice in the forum itself or in the system of laws
under which it sat. Moreover, comity required an absence of fraud
in the procurement of the decree, along with the lack of any remaining
reason which would preclude the principle from being allowed its full
effect. 107
Subsequently, the Restatement refined the definition of comity to
promote recognition only where the judgment was rendered under a
system with impartial tribunals and circumstances in which all relevant
procedures were compatible with due process of law. 08° Further, the
,04 See supra text accompanying note 93.
,o, See supra text accomanying note 93.
1- 159 U.S. 113 (1894).
, Id. at 202-03. Hilton also found that reciprocity between the forum state and
the country issuing the judgment was required in order for comity to be present.
This limitation is now rarely followed. See supra text accompanying note 25.
'0 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 482(1).
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Restatement distillation mandated the presence of personal jurisdiction
over the defendant according to the law of the rendering forum and
under United States standards of due process.' °9
Under the Restatement, enforcement was discretionary where the
original forum lacked subject matter jurisdiction or the defendant
was not accorded adequate notice of the proceeding." 0 Similarly,
validation was again viewed as discretionary if certain elements could
be shown: (1) if the decision was obtained by fraud; (2) if the cause
of action underlying the lawsuit was repugnant to the public policy
of the United States or of the implementing state; (3) if the ruling
conflicted with another final decree entitled to acknowledgment; or
(4) if the proceeding in the foreign country was contrary to an
agreement between the parties to submit the controversy to another
tribunal.' Likewise, the Uniform Laws Annotated enumerated vir-
tually identical grounds for determining that a foreign adjudication
was non-conclusive in states which have adopted it.112
The comity standards which have developed since Hilton furnish
sound guidelines for determining which final revenue rulings should
be granted recognition. In addition to providing uniformity in the
enforcement of tax and non-tax decisions, all other concerns specific
to these judgments raised by Moore"3 and Gilbertson"4 can be fully
109 Id.
110 Id.
11I Id.
"I FOREION MONEY JUDGMENTS § 4, 13 U.L.A. 265 (1986) provides:
(a) A foreign judgment is not conclusive if(1) the judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide impartial
tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law;(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant; or
(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter.
(b) A foreign judgment need not be recognized if(1) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive notice
of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend;
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(3) the [cause of action] [claim for relief] on which the judgment is based is
repugnant to the public policy of this state;
(4) the judgment conflicts which another final and conclusive judgment;
(5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement between the
parties under which the dispute in question was to be settled otherwise than by
proceedings in that court; or
(6) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign court
was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action.
"I Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1929).
114 Her Majesty the Queen in the Right of the Province of B.C. v. Gilbertson,
597 F.2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1979).
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addressed within this stricture. Those decrees based on levies which
jurisdictions regard as wholly unfair, impermissible in the United
States, or otherwise repugnant to United States judicial precepts could
be excluded under the provisions refusing validation on public policy
grounds." 5
If tribunals were to feel that the Restatement or Uniform Laws
Annotated principles, for example, were insufficient guards against
heightened concerns raised by tax rulings specifically, there are options
available to supply additional security. Since there is less assurance
that a levying state's causes of action are accurate or fair in a default
judgment, as opposed to a decision in a contested suit," 6 a court
could initiate a policy to exclude enforcement of default tax decrees.
Alternatively, a jurisdiction may decide to require reciprocity before
recognition of any assessment decision, or perhaps of only default
judgments since these include the strongest potential for jurisdictional
overreaching or denial of basic due process protections. While rec-
iprocity along these lines is rarely required in modern day non-revenue
adjudications," 7 the Gilbertson court found it was an essential ele-
ment." 8 In addition to encouraging recognition of United States tax
judgments abroad, mutuality of enforcement also may help reduce
the likelihood of injustice in some cases.119
IV. CoNrcLusIoN
When viewed in the light of the birth of the revenue rule along
with the United States' present economic and political position, con-
tinuance of the tax judgment exclusion seems anachronistic and de-
structive. A revamping of the rule along the lines described in this
article would benefit the United States in a number of ways. Foremost,
the United States would realize long term financial gains due to
today's highly integrated international markets and economies. En-
forcement would additionally provide a secondary, albeit more in-
i Conceivably, a recognizing tribunal could even refuse validation on public
policy grounds-that the adjudication itself was repugnant to policy of that state-
if it finds that the civic analysis necessitated in that particular case excessively invaded
international relations.
116 See Casad, supra note 101.
"' See supra text accompanying note 25.
I's Id.
119 See Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of B.C. v. Gilbertson,
596 F.2d 1161, 1166 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 412 (1964)).
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direct, increase in capital. As it stands now, some foreign nations
maintain a revenue rule similar to that of the United States and
decline to give conclusive effect to alien tax rulings for similar reasons. 20
Nevertheless, virtually all sovereign states assess levies, and recognition
of final decisions by United States courts would strongly encourage
reciprocal conduct by other countries. This type of mutual acknow-
ledgment by other nations would allow domestic jurisdictions to
recoup tax revenue now irretrievably lost.
Moreover, validation of these decisions would result in a variety
of other prolonged benefits, such as the discouragement of tax eva-
sion. The present system effectively provides immunity to careful
evaders since, as it stands now, a foreign state that has obtained an
assessment decree is prevented from securing recovery against a person
whose assets may be solely within the United States or are easily
transferred outside the home country once a judgment has been issued.
Further, a tax evader is permitted to enjoy the various benefits of
the levying government while escaping the cost of maintaining that
institution.121
,20 E.g., Canada (United States v. Harden, 1963 S.C.R. 366) and England (Gov-
ernment of India v. Taylor, [1955] App. Cas. 491 (appeal taken from H.L. (E))).
"I The court in State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Rodgers was aware of this
potential. It commented that "[tthe taxpayer who enjoys the protection of government
should bear his share of the expense of maintaining the government, and should
not be permitted to escape his obligation by crossing states lines," when deciding
to entertain a sister state suit for taxes. 193 S.W.2d 927 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946).
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